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PACE LAW REVIEW 
Volume 15 Spring 1995 Number 3 
Articles 
Whatever Happened to the "Best Interests" 
Analysis in New York Relocation Cases? 
A Response 
Merril Sobie* 
In her article Whatever Happened to the "Best Interests" 
Analysis in New York Relocation Cases?,l Justice Sondra Miller 
presents a sharply critical analysis of the "exceptional circum- 
stances" standard,2 applied by the New York courts in deter- 
mining custody modification proceedings when the custodial 
parent relocates to a geographically distant locale.3 Initially ar- 
ticulated by the Court of Appeals in Weiss v. Weiss,4 the test 
requires that the custodial parent establish, first, the presence 
of exceptional circumstances which necessitate the relocation, 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. BA. Brooklyn College. 
J.D. New York University. Professor Sobie has written widely concerning juvenile 
justice and children's rights. 
1. Sondra Miller, Whatever Happened to the "Best Interests" Analysis in New 
York Relocation Cares, 15 PACE L. REV. 339 (1995). 
2. See Miller, supm, note 1, at 341-42, 373-76, 382-84. 
3. See Miller, supm, note 1, at 340-41. 
4. 52 N.Y.2d 170,418 N.E.2d 377,436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981). 
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such as economic hardship or health considerations, and, sec- 
ond, that relocation is in "the best interests of the child."6 
Concluding, after a thorough analysis, that the standard 
has resulted in confused, inconsistent, and frequently irrecon- 
cilable decisions which, in fact, serve the best interests of no 
one,6 Justice Miller advocates its abolition.7 To replace excep- 
tional circumstances, she proposes a slightly modified "best in- 
terests of the child" standard.8 Assuming prima facie evidence 
that "(1) the motivation underlying the [relocation] is one of 
good faith . . . ; (2) a rational basis exists for [finding] that the 
relocation will provide a better life for the family unit . . . ; 
(3) the child will enjoy a healthy, decent lifestyle . . . ; [and] (4) a 
proposed visitation program will provide the noncustodial par- 
ent with sufficient visitation," the court would determine 
whether relocation is in the child's best interests:9 
A move will be allowed, or not, because it has been demonstrated 
that it is, or it is not, in the child's best interests. Exceptional 
circumstances will not pose a threshold, nor wi l l  there be a pre- 
sumption against relocation. If the child's best interests wil l  be 
served by a relocation, a move wil l  be allowed. If not, the move 
wil l  be eqjoined.10 
For the reasons outlined in this response, I respecthlly dis- 
agree. In my opinion, exceptional circumstances is a fair and 
equitable doctrine. As interpreted by the courts in the years 
since Weiss, the standard appropriately balances the needs, in- 
terests, and expectations of the custodial parent, the noncus- 
todial parent, and the child. It is not perfect, but no standard 
designed to balance competing interests and applied by human 
institutions ever is. There have been some inconsistent re- 
sults,ll although several seemingly conflicting cases can be rec- 
onciled by examining the conduct of the custodial parent, 
5. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 197 A.D.2d 771,772,602 N.Y.S.2d 953,955 (3d Dep't 
1993); Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 100, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 973 (2d Dep't 
1993); Hollington v. Cocchiola, 180 A.D.2d 635, 636, 579 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (2d 
Dep't 1992). 
6. Miller, supm note 1, at 341, 382-85. 
7. Id. at 384-85. 
8. See id. at 385-87. 
9. Id. at 385. 
10. Id. at 386. 
11. See genemlly influ part IV. 
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specifically, whether the custodial parent sought court approval 
before the move or, instead, relocated in violation of a court or- 
der.12 I agree that the rule places a difficult burden on the cus- 
todial parent, but believe that is where it should lie. Lastly, I 
believe that the Weiss standard leads to more predictable judi- 
cial determinations and guidance than the far more subjective 
and vague "best interests of the child" principle. 
This response will first discuss the competing interests and 
expectations of the parties to a relocation dispute,l3 and briefly 
outline the national view or views.14 In fact, there is no national 
standard, or anything approaching a consensus among the 
states.l5 The New York experience under the exceptional cir- 
cumstances standard will then be analyzed and appraised.16 
My conclusion is that the standard should be maintained, 
although I believe that the Court of Appeals should revisit the 
issue to clarify the factors and criteria relevant to a 
determination. l7 
I. The Interests 
Child custody and visitation proceedings involve three par- 
ticipants-the father, the mother, and the child or children. 
Each parent has an interest in maintaining a relationship with 
the child. Custody, sole or joint, is one means of securing that 
relationship. Absent custody, a continuing relationship and 
parenting role is provided through the mechanism we call, 
rather clumsily, visitation. .Visitation may result in a less in- 
tense or deep parent-child relationship than custody (though 
that is not always the case), but is nevertheless a very impor- 
tant f d l i a l  component. For this reason, caselaw requires that 
visitation be awarded regardless of the best interests of the 
child, absent a showing of "exceptional circumstances" or detri- 
ment to the child.18 
12. See infm part IV. 
13. See infm part I .  
14. See infm part 11. 
15. See infm part 11. 
16. See infm parts 111 and IV. 
17. See infm part V .  
18. See, e.g., Strahl v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 574, 414 N.Y.2d 184, 186 (2d 
Dep't 1979), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479,429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980). 
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The child's interests are of a similar nature. The child has 
the right to maintain a continuing and meaningful relationship 
with each parent.lg Parents may divorce each other, but do not 
divorce their offspring. Visitation is therefore considered the 
joint right of the child and the noncustodial ~a ren t .2~  Except 
when there exists a risk of physical or emotional harm, the child 
should rightfully enjoy the company and input of both parents.21 
In a custody or visitation dispute where both parents reside 
in the same community, or at least within commuting range, 
the rights and interests of all the participants can be protected 
by balancing custody with visitation. It may not be a facile ex- 
ercise, and the disappointments in dissolving an integral family 
unit may be severe, but the court possesses the ability to  order 
the continuation of a meaningful relationship between the child 
and each of the then-embattled parents.22 However, that ability 
breaks down when the custodial parent decides, for whatever 
reason, to relocate to a distant locale.23 Relocation is the only 
voluntary event which jeopardizes the continuation of a mean- 
ingful relationship with each parent. One of the bonds must be 
broken, or at least severely diminished. 
The precipitating fact is the custodial parent's decision to 
move. Courts are powerless to prevent a parental move. By ex- 
ercising his or her right to relocate, the custodial parent thereby 
unilaterally frustrates the noncustodial parent's visitation or, to 
phrase it more appropriately, the continuation of a meaningful 
19. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169 A.D.2d 29, 32,572 N.Y.S.2d 689,691 
(2d Dep't 1991) (stating that "the best interests of a child lie in his being nurtured 
and guided by both of his natural parents"); Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191,193, 
441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 494 (2d Dep't 1981) (same). 
20. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 
862, 865 (1981). 
21. See generally Katz v. Katz, 97 A.D.2d 398,398,467 N.Y.S.2d 223,224 (2d 
Dep't 1983) (stating that "[iln the absence of 'a pressing concern' and that proof 
that visitation is 'inimical to the welfare of the children,' the parent to whom cus- 
tody is not awarded must be granted reasonable visitation privileges") (quoting 
Quinn v. Quinn, 87 A.D.2d 643,643,448 N.Y.S.2d 248,249 (2d Dep't 1982)); Hotze 
v. Hotze, 57 A.D.2d 85,87-88,394 N.Y.S.2d 753,756 (4th Dep't 1977) (stating that 
"when the exposure of a child to one of its parents presents a risk of physical [and 
emotional] harm, a court should deny visitation"). 
22. See generally Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 175,418 N.E.2d a t  380,436 N.Y.S.2d a t  
865. 
23. See Miller, supra note 1, a t  373 n.273. 
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relationship.24 Something has to give, and the court is faced 
with the perhaps Hobson's choice of changing custody or sanc- 
tioning an abridgement of the child-parent relationship unless, 
of course, the custodial parent seeks prior permission to relo- 
cate, is unsuccessful, and then elects to remain. 
When analyzing the problem and weighing alternative so- 
lutions, one should consider the continuing interests of each 
participant. One should also consider the responsibilities and 
obligations of custodianship. It is true, as Justice Miller notes, 
that the noncustodial parent is "free to move whenever and 
wherever he wishes . . . .n25 But it is also true that the custodial 
parent, unlike his or her noncustodial counterpart, has freely 
undertaken the burden of custodianship. As stated by Justice 
Bracken, dissenting in Hemphill v. Hemphill,26 "I conclude that 
the case must be decided with reference to the [exceptional cir- 
cumstances] rule which disfavors the relocating parent, since it 
is that parent who, even if for the best of reasons, must ulti- 
mately be considered responsible for the breakdown of what had 
been a fair and equitable custody arrangement."27 
11. Other Jurisdictions 
Different jurisdictions have taken, well, different views re- 
garding relocation. There is no national consensus. Indeed, 
there is such a multiplicity of views that the rules cannot even 
be easily categorized.28 
In Minnesota, for example, there is a presumption in favor 
of relocation.29 To overcome the presumption the party oppos- 
ing the relocation must "establish[ 1 by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the move is not in the best interests of the 
chiid.*30 
24. See infra text accompanying note 27; see also generally infra part IV. 
25. Miller, supra note 1, at 383. 
26. 169 A.D.2d 29,572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 1991). 
27. Id. at 41, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Bracken, J., dissenting). 
28. See generally Mandy S. Cohen, Note, A Toss of the Dice . . . The Gamble 
with Post-Divorce Relocation Laws, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127 (1989). 
29. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1983); see also Ayers v. Ayers, 
508 N.W.2d 515,519 (Minn. 1993); Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269,270 (Minn. 
1983); Cohen, supra note 28, at 147-48. 
30. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399; see also Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 270. 
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New York is, more or less, at the opposite end of the spec- 
trum, and is not alone.31 In South Carolina, for example, there 
- 
is a clear presumption against re locat i~n.~~ Removal is permit- 
ted, however, in situations where it will benefit the child.33 
California was in the past quite permissive in permitting 
relocation. Indeed, the fact that the removal deprived the non- 
custodial parent of visitation rights was held to be " 'generally' 
insufficient to justify restraint on the [custodial parent's] free 
rn0vement."3~ However, even the mobile state par excellence 
now recognizes the importance of the relationship between the 
child and the noncustodial parent.35 
New Jersey and Illinois, the two states analyzed by Justice 
Miller,56 are at neither pole of the jurisdictional array. New 
Jersey, which utilizes a slightly modified best interests test,37 is 
31. See Cohen, supra note 28, a t  137 n.57. 
32. McAlister v. Patterson, 299 S.E.2d 322,323 (S.C. 1982); see also Eckstein 
v. Eckstein, 410 S.E.2d 578, 580 (Sic. Ct. App. 1991). 
33. McAlister, 299 S.E.2d a t  323; Marshall v. Marshall, 320 S.E.2d 44, 49-50 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1984); see also Eckstein, 410 S.E.2d a t  580. 
34. In re Cignovich, 61 Cal. Rptr. 261,263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Walker 
v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. Rptr. 114, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Stack v. Stack, 11 
Cal. Rptr. 177, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961)); Dozier v. Dozier, 334 P.2d 957,961 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1959) (stating that the fact that the removal of the child from the state 
would deprive the noncustodial parent of his visitation rights "is generally not 
alone suEicient to justify restraint on the mother's free movement unless the [re- 
moval] is inconsistent with the welfare of the child"). 
35. See Cooper v. Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295,299 (Cal. Ct. App. 19.93) (stating 
that the custodial parent seeking to remove the child from the state had the bur- 
den of proving that "the move . . . was both necessary to [the custodial parent] and 
would have no detrimental effect on [the child] or his relationship with [the non- 
custodial parent] and that it was in [the child's] best interest"); In re McGinnis, 9 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that the custodial parent's 
removal of the child from the jurisdiction would impact on the noncustodial par- 
ent's "ability to have frequent and continuing contact with his or her children"); In 
re Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840,844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the trial court 
did not err in considering "the effect that the [custodial] mother's contemplated 
move would have on the father's exercise of visitation . . ."I. See also CAL. FAM. 
CODE 5 3020 (declaring it the public policy of California "to assure minor children 
of frequent and continuing contact with both parents a h r  the parents have sepa- 
rated or dissolved their marriage . . ."I. 
36. See Miller, supra note 1, a t  376-82. 
37. See Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852,855 (N.J. 1988) (holding that "a cus- 
todial parent may move with the children of the maniage to another state as long 
as the move does not interfere with the best interests of the children or the visita- 
tion rights of the non-custodial parent"). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. 8 9:2-2 (West 
19931, which provides that: 
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liberal, though not as permissive as Minnesota.38 Good cause, 
or at  least a "sincere, good-faith reasonn to relocate must be 
shown.99 Once this burden is satisfied, the court then considers 
"whether the move [would] be inimical to  the best interests of 
the children or [would] adversely affect the visitation rights of 
the noncustodial parent."M Illinois is more complex and, I 
gather, more stringent than New Jersey in sanctioning a pro- 
posed or already accomplished relocation. The burden is placed 
on the custodial parent to prove that the move would be in the 
best interests of the child,41 and the impact of a removal on visi- 
tation between the child and the noncustodial parent is a rele- 
vant factor.42 
Other states follow still other permutations and variations 
in grappling with the relocation dile1nma.~3 The multiplicity of 
standards, presumptions, exceptions, and plain ambivalence 
are a testament, I suppose, to the difficult issues facing the 
court. In no other custody dispute are the interests of the par- 
ties, parent and child alike, more difllcult to bridge. Given the 
lack of a national consensus, I believe it prudent that New York 
move slowly, if at all, in modifying relocation standards. No one 
seems to have found a better way, though many have found a 
different way. 
if minor children of divorced parents "are natives of mew Jersey] or have 
resided five years within its limits, they shall not be removed out of [the] 
jurisdiction against their own consent, if of suitable age to signify the same, 
nor while under that age without the consent of both parents, unless the 
court, upon cause shown, shall otherwise order. 
Id. 
38. See genemlly Cohen, supm note 28, a t  137 11.57, 147-48. 
39. Holder, 544 A.2d a t  856 (interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. 8 9-2:2 to require 
that the custodial parent show a "sincere, good-faith reasonn for relocating with 
the child outside the jurisdiction); see also Winer v. Winer, 575 A.2d 518,522 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
40. Holder, 544 k 2 d  at 856. 
41. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., ch. 750, 51609 (Michie 1993); In re Eckert, 518 
N.E.2d 1041,1044 (Ill. 1988); In re Taylor, 621 N.E.2d 273,275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); 
In re Herkert, 615 N.E.2d 833,837 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re Pribble, 607 N.E.2d 
349, 353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re Ballegeer, 602 N.E.2d 852, 854 (nl. App. Ct. 
1992); In re Davis, 594 N.E.2d 734, 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
42. See, e.g., Eckert, 518 N.E.2d a t  1045 (stating that the impact of the pro- 
posed move on the visitation rights of the noncustodial parents "should be care- 
fully consideredn); In re Bednar, 496 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
43. See Cohen, supm note 28, a t  130 m.20, 21. 
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111. Application of the Exceptional Circumstances Standard 
Before considering the impact of the New York exceptional 
circumstances standard, it may be helpful to outline those situ- 
ations in which it does not apply. First, exceptional circum- 
stances need be shown only for relocation to a distant locale.4 
There exists a plethora of decisions allowing a relocation over a 
"reasonable* distance, coupled, when appropriate, with modi- 
fied visitation pr0visions.~5 The custodial parent is quite free to 
move with the child to the next town, the next county, or even 
from Westchester County to SufEolk County, i.e., from one end 
of the New York City suburbs to the other.de In determining the 
issue of "distance" the numeric mileage as well as the travel 
time, and burden and expense of travel are all relevant.47 
Second, the standard is not relevant when the noncustodial 
parent has failed to establish or continue a meaningful relation- 
ship with the child.48 After all, the rule's purpose is the preser- 
vation of a meaningfid relationship, unless exceptional 
circumstances exist which outweigh that consideration.49 Not 
- - -- - - - 
44. See Bennett v. Bennett, 208 A.D.2d 1042,1043,617 N.Y.S.2d 931,932 (3d 
Dep't 1994) (stating that the exceptional circumstances standard 'does not apply 
when the relocation 'is not so distant as to deprive the noncustodial parent of regu- 
lar and meaningful access to the child' ") (quoting Lake v. Lake, 192 A.D.2d 751, 
752-53, 596 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (3d Dep't 1993)). 
45. See, e.g., Lake v. Lake, 192 A.D.2d 751,596 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1993); 
Jacoby v. Carter, 167 A.D.2d 786, 563 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't 1990); Partridge v. 
Myerson, 162 A.D.2d 507,556 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2d Dep't 1990); Lenenthal v. Webster, 
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, a t  23 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). 
46. See Partridge, 162 A.D.2d a t  509,556 N.Y.S.2d a t  709. The custodial par- 
ent, however, may be constrained by a "radius" provision in a separation agree- 
ment whereby the parent agrees to a relocation restriction. 
47. Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 100, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 972 (2d Dep't 
1993); Blundell v. Blundell, 150 A.D.2d 321, 324, 540 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (2d Dep't 
1989). 
48. See Radford, 190 A.D.2d a t  99,597 N.Y.S.2d a t  972 (stating that in order 
to reach the question of exceptional circumstances, i t  must first be demonstrated 
that the relocation would deprive the noncustodial parent of "frequent and regular 
access to his or her children"). 
49. See Bennett, 208 A.D.2d a t  1043, 617 N.Y.S.2d a t  932 (3d Dep't 1994) 
(stating that "the benchmark against which the applicability of the relocation rule 
is measured is 'meaninghl access', i.e., the ability of a noncustodial parent to con- 
tinue to maintain a close and me- relationship with his or her children 
. . ."I; RadfonE, 190 A.D.2d a t  99,597 N.Y.S.2d a t  972 (stating that " '[tlhe overrid- 
ing concern is with the best interests of the children, which are clearly nurtured by 
a continued relationship with a noncustodial parent who has maintained reason- 
able visitation . . .'") (quoting Ferguson v. Ressico, 125 A.D.2d 915, 916, 510 
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surprisingly, the cases rejecting a relocation bid are replete 
with statements concerning the consistency of visitation and 
other indicia of close bonds between the child and the noncus- 
todial parent.50 Of course, parents who contest a relocation are 
likely to have hlly exercised visitation-an uncaring father or 
mother will probably not object to a relocation, or a t  least will 
not be willing to devote the time and expense necessary to liti- 
gate the matter. 
Where the two "threshold" facts have been satisfied, i.e., 
the move is to a distant locale and the noncustodial parent has 
maintained a meaningful relationship, the exceptional circum- 
stances test becomes relevant and the custodial parent seeking 
relocation, or who has already relocated, has the burden of 
proof.51 The factors which are encompassed by this standard 
are comprehensibly explained in Justice Miller's article.S2 Suf- 
fice it to say that the standard is not readily fulfilled. There 
must be an economic necessity, a specific job opportunity not 
available near home, a health necessity, or other compelling 
reason.53 In my opinion, that is appropriate. 
Only one contingency, remarriage, has resulted in several 
apparently unfair decisions.54 The issue is whether the custo- 
dial parent's remarriage to a spouse who resides and is em- 
ployed in a distant geographic area constitutes an exceptional 
circumstance, particularly when the new spouse cannot easily 
N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (3d Dep't 1986)). See generally Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 
175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981). 
50. See, e.g., Bennett, 208 A.D.2d a t  1043, 617 N.Y.S.2d a t  933; Raybin v. 
Raybin, 205 A.D. 2d 918,920,613 N.Y.S.2d 726,728 (3d Dep't 1994); Radford, 190 
A.D.2d a t  99, 597 N.Y.S.2d a t  972; Leslie v. Leslie, 180 A.D.2d 620, 622, 579 
N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (2d Dep't 1992); Rybicki v. Rybicki, 176 A.D.2d 867, 871, 575 
N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (2d Dep't 1991); Wiles v. Wiles, 171 A.D.2d 398, 400, 578 
N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (4th Dep't 1991). 
51. See Lake v. Lake, 192 A.D.2d 751, 752, 596 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (3d Dep't 
1993); Radford, 190 A.D.2d a t  99-100, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 972-73; see also Bennett, 
208 A.D.2d a t  1043-44,617 N.Y.S.2d a t  933; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 197 A.D.2d 771, 
772,602 N.Y.S.2d 953,955 (3d Dep't 1993); Wiles, 171 A.D.2d a t  400,578 N.Y.S.2d 
a t  293. 
52. See Miller, supm note 1, a t  part 1II.A. 
53. Bennett, 208 A.D.2d a t  1044,617 N.Y.S.2d a t  933;Atkinson, 197 A.D.2d a t  
772, 602 N.Y.S.2d a t  955; see also Richardson v. Howard, 135 A.D.2d 1140, 1140, 
523 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (4th Dep't 1987). 
54. See, e.g., Elkus v. Elkus, 182 A.D.2d 45,588 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep't 1992); 
CooperJones v. Williams, 162 A.D.2d 1001, 557 N.Y.S.2d 214 (4th Dep't 1990); 
Richardson v. Howard, 135 A.D.2d 1140,523 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1987). 
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move to the child's locale. In Weiss, the Court of Appeals fore- 
saw the possibility and, in dicta, differentiated remarriage: 
"[Als we know, this is not a case where the obligations under- 
taken by a divorced parent who marries anew require a dra- 
matic change of locale."55 
In recent years the Appellate Division, Second Department, 
has treated remarriage as an exceptional circumstance. That 
was the situation in Hemphill v. Hemphill,56 where the new 
husband's "business or livelihood depended upon his living and 
working in England."57 However, the First and Fourth Depart- 
ments have not followed suit. In Elkus v. Elkus,58 for example, 
the First Department held that the fact that the custodial par- 
ent's new spouse resided in California and could not relocate did 
not constitute exceptional circumstances.59 
Remarriage is one issue which warrants clarification by the 
Court of Appeals. Placing the custodial parent in the untenable 
position of sacrificing child custody or a spouse serves no one. 
In effect, the new spouse should stand in the shoes of the custo- 
dial parent. If failure to relocate will result in economic hard- 
ship, exceptional circumstances should be satisfied and the 
court should turn to  the best interests of the child. 
Best interests is the final prong of a relocation determina- 
tion. That standard always constitutes the overarching consid- 
eration in a custody case.60 Even when exceptional 
circumstances are shown, the court should and will determine 
whether relocation is in the child's best interest. Conversely, 
custody should not be changed to the noncustodial parent with- 
55. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 177, 418 N.E.2d 377, 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d 
862, 866 (1981). 
56. 169 A.D.2d 29, 571 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 1991). 
57. Id. at 32, 572 N.Y.S.2d a t  691. But see LoBianco v. LoBianco, 131 A.D.2d 
642,516 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep't 1987) (precluding the child's move to Canada after 
conducting a complete b e s t  interests" analysis). 
58. 182 A.D.2d 45,588 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep't 1992). 
59. Id. a t  49, 588 N.Y.S.2d a t  140; see also Richardson v. Howard, 135 A.D.2d 
1140, 1140, 523 N.Y.S. 272, 273 (4th Dep't 1987) (holding that the custodial 
mother's desire to remarry and move to hernew husband's locale was an  insuffi- 
cient justification for removal of the children). 
60. Miller, supra note 1, a t  366 & n.244 (citing Lavane v. Lavane, 201 A.D.2d 
623, 623, 608 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (2d Dep't 1994); Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 
93, 100,597 N.Y.S.2d 967,973 (2d Dep't 1993); Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807,808, 
460 N.Y.S.2d 607,608 (2d Dep't 1983); Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191,193,441 
N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (2d Dep't 1981)). 
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out an exploration of best interests. Thus, as noted by Justice 
Miller, in LoBianco v. LoBiancoGl the court assessed all relevant 
considerations before transferring ~ustody.6~ NO reasonable 
person would advocate transferring custody to an unfit parent, 
or urge a modification which conflicts directly with the interests 
of the child. The difficulty lies in the large number of cases 
where both parents are fit, capable, and concerned, and where 
the child has developed a meaningful relationship with both. 
There, and only there, should a relocation be precluded unless 
outweighed by necessity or hardship. The fact that the excep- 
tional circumstances standard has been appropriately applied 
in many cases simply means that in the majority of litigated 
relocation matters each parent is fit and caring. 
IV. The Exceptional Circumstances Standard Appraised 
In my opinion, the exceptional circumstances standard has 
served the state better than would any alternative. There al- 
ways are and always will be some inconsistencies when the 
courts adjudicate emotional human needs and desires. As noted 
by Justice Miller, there also have been an unusual number of 
appellate reversals.63 That phenomenon may indicate the need 
for appropriate guidance, perhaps by the Court of Appeals, but 
is not, in itself, a reason to change the standard. 
Several seemingly inconsistent decisions can be reconciled 
by looking a t  the conduct of the custodial parent. A relocation 
case may be filed either before or after the move to a distant 
locale. When the custodial parent petitions for court approval 
prior to the move, he or she is probably asking in good faith, or 
at least has not intentionally undermined the other party's in- 
terest. However, when the parent relocates without permis- 
sion, visitation rights are unilaterally frustrated, or, worse, 
terminated. Further, the relocating parent has violated an ex- 
isting court order or agreement, and is probably in contempt of 
court. While violation of a court order is not in itself disposi- 
61. 131 A.D.26 642, 516 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep't 1987). 
62. See Miller, supra note 1, at 362 (citing LoBiamo, 131 A.D.2d at 643, 516 
N.Y.S.2d at 725). 
63. See Miller, supra note 1, at 373 11.272 and cases cited therein. 
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tive,e4 courts appear to be very reluctant to find exceptional cir- 
cumstances in those situations.65 
Indeed, a "fait accompli" relocation is usually disallowed. 
Of eight appellate cases in the past decade, six denied a post- 
relocation attempt to seek judicial approval.66 The message is 
clear. Parents who relocate in violation of a court order do so a t  
their peril, in my opinion rightly so. 
There are apparent inconsistencies between departments 
when a parent seeks prior judicial approval or the noncustodial 
parent seeks to enjoin a move. The Third Department appears 
to apply the exceptional circumstances test strictly,67 while the 
Second and Fourth Departments are more flexible.68 Somewhat 
64. See Friederwitzer v. F'riederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89,94,432 N.E.2d 765,767- 
68, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895-96 (1982) (stating that "self-heIp through abduction by 
the noncustodial parent must be deterred but even that 'must, when necessary, be 
submerged to the paramount concern in all custody matters: the best interest of 
the child . . .' ") (quoting Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242,250,372 N.E.2d 4,8,401 
N.Y.S.2d 168,172 (1977)); Wodka v. Wodka, 168 A.D.2d 1000,1001,565 N.Y.S.2d 
353,354 (4th Dep't 1990) (stating that "defiance of a court order is but one factor to 
be considered when determining the relative fitness of the parties and what cus- 
tody arrangement is in the child's best interests"). 
65. See, e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 199 A.D.2d 1065,606 N.Y.S.2d 480 (4th Dep't 
1993); Ellor v. Ellor, 145 A.D.2d 773,535 N.Y.S.2d 643 (3d Dep't 1988); Morgano v. 
Morgano, 119 A.D.2d 734, 511 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dep't 1986). 
66. The six cases are: Schultz v. Schultz, 199 A.D.2d 1065,606 N.Y.S.2d 480 
(4th Dep't 1993); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 197 A.D.2d 771,602 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d Dep't 
1993); Sanders v. Sanders, 185 A.D.2d 716, 585 N.Y.S.2d 891 (4th Dep't 1992); 
Ellor v. Ellor, 145 A.D.2d 773,535 N.Y.S.2d 643 (3d Dep't 1988); Morgano v. Mor- 
gano, 119 A.D.2d 734, 511 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dep't 1986); Barie v. Faulkner, 115 
A.D.2d 1003, 497 N.Y.S.2d 565 (4th Dep't 1985). 
The post-relocation cases permitting relocation of the child are: Schouten v. 
Schouten, 155 A.D.2d 461, 547 N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d Dep't 1989); Pecorello v. 
Snodgrass, 142 A.D.2d 920, 530 N.Y.S.2d 350 (4th Dep't 1988). 
67. See Bennett v. Bennett, 208 A.D.2d 1042, 617 N.Y.S.2d 931 (3d Dep't 
1994) (finding that the custodial mother's desire to move 180 miles to attend col- 
lege did not constitute exceptional circumstances, since her desire to relocate was 
prompted by "betterment rather than necessity," and since the move would "dis- 
rupt [the noncustodial father's] ability to continue a close and me- relation- 
ship with his children"); Murphy v. Murphy, 195 A.D.2d 794,600 N.Y.S.2d 373 (3d 
Dep't 1993) (holding that the custodial mother's need for contact with and emo- 
tional support from her close friends in the Rochester area did not constitute ex- 
ceptional circumstances and that the move would deny the father, in Saugerties, 
meanineful contact with his children). 
68. See Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169 A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 
1991) (holding that the custodial mother's remarriage to an English citizen consti- 
tuted exceptional circumstances and that it was "in the best interests of the chil- 
dren to continue to reside with their mother"); Pecorello v. Snodgrass, 142 A.D.2d 
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different approaches between departments are not uncommon, 
and custody cases are notoriously case specific, involving differ- 
ent facts and circumstances. 
One additional observation: Relocation, unlike almost any 
other custody proceeding, does not invariably result in the pre- 
vailing party achieving actual custody. The issue is whether to 
permit relocation of the child, or deny such permission. If a re- 
location request is granted, custody is obviously not changed. 
But even if a relocation request is denied, custody may not be 
modified. In that event the custodial parent has a choice of relo- 
cating and surrendering custody, or not relocating and main- 
taining custody. No wonder a straight best interests standard 
is not utilized. 
If the custodial parent does not relocate, the result may 
well be in the child's best interest-both parties remain avail- 
able and the child can maintain a meaningful relationship with 
each. We do not know how many custodial parents who fail to 
prevail in obtaining judicial approval subsequently elect to re- 
main. Given the emotional ties and the overwhelming impor- 
tance of custody to most parents, many surely remain and 
continue the pre-existing custody and visitation scheme. For all 
we know, even hsa lyn  Weiss, the infamous respondent in the 
Court of Appeals landmark exceptional circumstances case,69 
decided to forego her intended "new life* in Las Vegas for the 
mundane life of raising her child in New York. 
V. Justice Miller's Proposed Solution 
As has been noted, Justice Miller advocates that the excep- 
tional circumstances test be replaced by a "best interests of the 
child"tandard.70 Although tempered somewhat by requiring, 
as threshold facts, that the motivation for the move be one of 
good faith, that relocation will provide a better lifestyle, and 
that sufficient visitation will be provided,'l the thrust is pure 
best interests. Thus, "[tlhe basic change proposed is not a mat- 
920,530 N.Y.S.2d 350 (4th Dep't 1988) (holding that the custodial mother's remar- 
riage constituted exceptional circumstances, where her new husband's employ- 
ment was "involuntarily transferredn to another state due to a merger). 
69. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981). 
70. See Miller, supra note 1, at 385-87. 
71. See id. at 385. 
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ter of preference between fathers and mothers, but rather one of 
focus on the child considering all factors impacting upon that 
child's best interest unimpeded by rigid preconditions."72 
There are several problems in applying a straight best in- 
terest of the child approach, or even a slightly modified version. 
First, the focus would be, as intended, only upon the child. Yet 
visitation or a continuing meaningful relationship is a joint 
right between the child and the noncustodial ~arent .~3  As has 
been noted, relocation is the only voluntary event which jeopar- 
dizes that relationship. Vacation visitation from a distant lo- 
cale, while possible, is in no way the equivalent. A father or 
mother who sees his or her child on several occasions during the 
week, attends the child's school, athletic, and social hct ions ,  
entertains the child's fiends, and communicates constantly 
should not be readily forced to accept vacation visitation. Every 
facet of the parent-child relationship merits preservation, or at 
least should be maintained unless clearly outweighed by excep- 
tional circumstances. 
Second, the best interest standard is a highly subjective 
Just why it would result in greater predictability 
than the exceptional circumstances test75 is unfathomable to 
this writer. Economic or health necessity, each a component of 
the present exceptional circumstances standard,76 are relatively 
objective criteria. On the other hand, whether the child is bet- 
ter off at  a new location with the custodial parent, new fiends 
and a fresh environment, as opposed to  residing in the old tried- 
and-true location with existing fiends and a continuation of the 
noncustodial relationship, is far more subjective and, therefore, 
unpredictable. Reasonable people will differ. 
72. Id. at 387. 
73. See Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 175, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
74. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody AGudicatwn: Judicial Functions 
in the Face of Zndetenninacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. WBS. 226, 229 (1975) (stating 
that "determination of what is 'best' or least detrimental' for a particular child is 
usually indeterminative and speculative). 
75. See Miller, supra note 1, at 341-42. 
76. See supra text accompanying note 53; see also Bennett v. Bennett, 208 
A.D.2d 1042, 1044,617 N.Y.S.2d 931, 933 (3d Dep't 1994); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 
197 A.D.2d 771, 772, 602 N.Y.S.2d 953,955 (3d Dep't 1993); Richardson v. How- 
ard, 135 A.D.2d 1140,1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272,273 (4th Dep't 1987). 
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Best interests of the child presently constitutes an essential 
part of the two-pronged Weiss standard and should continue as 
an important component. However, it should not constitute the 
sole basis upon which to predicate a relocation determination. 
Third, a straight best interest test confuses the narrow is- 
sue of relocation with a broad issue of custody generally. Cus- 
tody is always modifiable based on the best interests of the 
child.77 The noncustodial parent may accordingly petition a t  
any time for custody and, if successful, the child thereafter re- 
sides with that parent. Relocation cases are different. As men- 
tioned, the object is to prevent relocation and not necessarily 
change custody. If the noncustodial parent prevails, the custo- 
dial parent has a choice-relocate without the child or remain 
with the child. 
If the noncustodial parent has s a c i e n t  grounds to modify 
custody based on the best interests of the child, other than the 
relocation, he or she should bring the action on that basis. The 
result, if successful, is custody-no ands, ifs, or buts. Why 
prove best interests in the context of a relocation case only to 
have the losing parent say, "sony, I've had second thoughts and 
will stay and of course will stay with Johnnie"? In sum, we 
should not confuse a straight best interests modification action, 
which always places custody on the line, with a relocation case, 
which does not place custody directly on the line. 
Last, substitution of a best interest of the child standard 
would defeat the prophylactic value of the exceptional circum- 
stances doctrine. Many custodial parents would prefer to relo- 
cate for many different reasons, good or bad. With the 
knowledge that they must prove exceptional circumstances, 
many undoubtedly decide against relocation. The cases which 
are litigated tend to be those in which the parent believes he or 
she has a good chance of prevailing under the standard. If a 
best interests test were substituted, court approval would be 
easier to obtain, or a t  least would appear easier to the parent. 
Pleadings and proof would revolve about that highly broad inde- 
terminate standard. Should we encourage litigation, particu- 
77. See generally Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89,93,432 N.E.2d 
765, 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982). 
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larly custody litigation with its baggage of emotionalism, 
tension, and unpredictability? 
VI. Conclusion 
The exceptional circumstances rule is a sound principle. 
Intended to balance the interests and expectations of each par- 
ent and the child, the rule preserves the parent-child relation- 
ship, when meaningfid, between the noncustodial parent and 
the child unless "exceptional circumstances" outweigh the bene- 
fit of such preservation. Further, the rule does not in itself re- 
sult in a change of custody. Custodial parents may choose, post- 
litigation, to refrain from relocating, thereby maintaining the 
status quo (unless the parent has already rashly relocated in 
defiance of a court order or agreement). In the absence of a 
compelling reason or a necessity to move, recognized under the 
rule, that is probably the most equitable result. 
Best interests of the child should continue as a significant 
factor in relocation cases. However, it should not be elevated to 
the status of the sole or even primary consideration. Substitu- 
tion of a straight best interest standard would render the im- 
portant policy of continuing a meaningful relationship with 
each parent a virtual nullity. Further, application would en- 
courage litigation, decrease predictability, and might result in 
even greater inconsistencies than at present. 
The Court of Appeals should nevertheless revisit the issue 
to  clarify the standard and resolve some of the ambiguities and 
uncertainty. In my opinion, the Court should state clearly and 
explicitly that the existence of a M l  meaningful relationship be- 
tween the noncustodial parent and the child constitutes an es- 
sential precondition to applying the exceptional circumstances 
test. Further, every indicia of the relationship should be ex- 
amined, perhaps assisted by appropriate forensic evaluations. 
One must have developed a relationship worthy of protection 
before expecting the court to  order its preservation. 
Second, the Court of Appeals should hold that remarriage 
to  a spouse who resides and is employed in a distant locale may 
constitute an exceptional circumstance. In essence, the new 
spouse should stand in the shoes of the custodial parent. If re- 
maining at the distant locale constitutes an economic necessity 
or other exceptional circumstance for the new spouse, the relo- 
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cation of the child should be permitted unless a best interest 
analysis concludes otherwise. 
The exceptional circumstances standard first articulated in 
Weiss has served the state well for the past fourteen years. In 
an increasingly mobile and an increasingly insecure society, a 
doctrine which encourages a meaningfbl parent-child relation- 
ship with each parent warrants judicial continuation and re- 
affirmation. 
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